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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner fled his home country of Ghana and entered 
the United States without authorization after his father and 
neighbors assaulted him and threatened his life when they 
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discovered that he was in a same-sex relationship.  Petitioner 
seeks asylum and withholding of removal under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection from 
removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
because he fears being persecuted or tortured on account of his 
sexual orientation and identity as a gay man if returned to 
Ghana – a country that criminalizes same-sex male 
relationships and has no proven track record of combatting 
widespread anti-gay violence, harassment and discrimination.  
The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his application and ordered 
his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
affirmed. 
He now petitions this Court for review of the BIA’s final 
decision.  He argues that the BIA erred in finding, among 
others, that he had not suffered past persecution and did not 
have a well-founded fear of future persecution.  For the 
following reasons, we will vacate the BIA’s decision and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Petitioner’s Experience in Ghana 
Petitioner was born and raised in Ghana’s capital, 
Accra.  He first realized he was gay when he was fourteen years 
old.  He came to this realization after sharing an intimate 
encounter with another boy, whom he had met at Muslim 
school.  One afternoon, the two boys were spending time 
together in Petitioner’s bedroom and, after sharing a toffee that 
 
1 Because we believe this case can be disposed of on the merits 
of Petitioner’s asylum claim, we will not resolve his 
withholding of removal or CAT claims at this time. 
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Petitioner had bought for his schoolmate, they had sex for the 
first time.  Over the next twelve years, the two young men 
continued to see each other but kept their sexual relationship 
hidden.  Being gay in Ghana, Petitioner believed, was simply 
“not acceptable.”  JA101.  He could not speak to his family 
about his feelings because he worried that, as Muslims, they 
would disapprove of his sexual orientation or, even worse, that 
his father would kill him. 
When Petitioner was twenty-six years old, his anxieties 
materialized into a harsh reality.  One morning in January 
2016, his father unexpectedly entered Petitioner’s bedroom at 
the break of dawn and discovered him having sex with his 
partner.  His father went into a rage and began shouting that 
“his son was hav[ing] sex with another man,” JA215, and 
called on others to “come, come and witness what my son is up 
to[!]” JA99 (Tr. 37:20–21).  He demanded answers from his 
son and condemned his actions: “Why do you engage in 
homosexuality?  You have brought shame to this family and I 
will make sure you face the wrath of this evil deed.”  JA166. 
Upon hearing this uproar, a crowd of neighbors 
gathered at Petitioner’s house, forming a violent mob.  
Together with his father, the mob began to beat the two young 
men with stones, wooden sticks, and iron rods, and dragged 
them into a courtyard.  Some in the mob wanted to report the 
young men to the police, but others began to argue over how 
best to punish them: death by burning or beheading. 
Petitioner believed the death threats were real.  He 
remembers being doused with kerosene, and hearing calls to 
set him on fire.  He also saw someone in the mob brandish a 
“cutlass,” JA215, a curved sword with a sharp edge like a 
machete.  Fearing that his life was in danger, he managed to 
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escape and ran naked, hurt and bleeding to a friend’s house 
about ten minutes away.  Petitioner told his friend about the 
attack and about his sexual relationship with his partner.  His 
friend, too, became afraid.  He worried that they could both be 
killed if people found out that Petitioner was hiding there. 
Too frightened to call the police, or seek medical care, 
Petitioner asked his friend to drive him to neighboring Togo.  
But Petitioner did not feel safe there either; he was concerned 
that the Togolese government and people disliked gay men too.  
Within about two weeks, he retrieved his passport from his 
home with his friend’s help and arranged to fly from Ghana to 
Ecuador.  Petitioner has heard that his father has publicly 
disowned him for being gay, that he is still looking for him, 
and that he intends to kill him if he finds him. 
Petitioner still worries about his partner of more than 
ten years.  Despite numerous attempts, he has not been able to 
reconnect with him since that horrific day. 
B.  Procedural History 
Petitioner eventually found his way to safety in the 
United States but entered the country without valid documents.  
Soon after, the Department of Homeland Security began 
proceedings to remove Petitioner and return him to Ghana.  In 
the course of removal proceedings, he applied for asylum, 
among other forms of relief.  Petitioner claimed that, after 
having been violently outed, attacked and threatened by his 
father and neighbors, he fears that he will be killed or otherwise 
persecuted in Ghana because he is gay. 
The IJ denied Petitioner’s application.  Although he 
found portions of Petitioner’s testimony to be less credible than 
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others, the IJ declined to make an adverse credibility 
determination.  Still, the IJ concluded that Petitioner had not 
established “past persecution” or a “well-founded fear of future 
persecution.”  JA24-25.  Notably, the IJ observed that “there 
[was] no reason to believe that [Petitioner] would not be able 
to live a full life, especially if he were to continue to keep his 
homosexuality a secret.”  JA25.  Petitioner appealed to the 
BIA. 
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the 
appeal.  Though it credited Petitioner’s account as credible, the 
BIA agreed that he had not established “past persecution” or a 
“well-founded fear or clear probability of future persecution.”  
JA14, 15.  The BIA “distance[d]” itself from the IJ’s 
observation that Petitioner could live a “full life” if he kept “his 
homosexuality a secret.”  JA15.   
Petitioner now seeks review of the BIA’s decision.2 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“[P]ersecution” and “well-founded fear of persecution” 
are “findings of fact that we review under the deferential 
substantial evidence standard[.]”  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 
477, 483 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Substantial evidence is more than a 
mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  Under this evidentiary standard, we defer 
to factual findings “unless any reasonable adjudicator would 
 
2 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) and 
1240.15.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
Petitioner timely petitioned for review.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(1). 
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be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  Espinosa-Cortez v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., 607 F.3d 101, 106-07 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 
F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We will uphold the agency’s 
findings of fact to the extent they are ‘supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as 
a whole.’”) (quoting I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 
481 (1992)).  We accord no deference to factual findings that 
“are based on inferences or presumptions that are not 
reasonably grounded in the record.”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 
228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting El Moraghy v. 
Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 202 (1st Cir. 2003)).  If the BIA 
“mischaracterized and understated the nature of the evidence 
supporting [an applicant]’s claims,” its findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Chavarria v. Gonzales, 446 
F.3d 508, 517 (3d Cir. 2006). 
If factual findings are based on a misunderstanding of 
the law, we will review the abstract legal determination de 
novo, subject to Chevron deference when applicable, to ensure 
uniformity in the application of the law.  Huang v. Att’y Gen. 
U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see 
Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 899 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(exercising de novo review where the BIA “misunderstood and 
misapplied the parameters” of the relevant legal standard, 
“leading [the BIA] to conduct improper factual findings when 
applying that standard”); Foroglou v. I.N.S., 170 F.3d 68, 70 
(1st Cir. 1999) (“The [BIA’s] application of the legal standards 
to specific facts is also entitled to deference,” but “[a]bstract 
rulings of law are subject to de novo review.”). 
When the BIA affirms the IJ’s determinations without 
expressly rejecting any of its findings and only adds its own 
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gloss to the analysis, we may review both the BIA’s and the 
IJ’s decisions.  Sandie v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
Under the INA, any person who is physically present in 
the United States, irrespective of his immigration status, may 
be granted asylum if he is a refugee within the meaning of the 
statute.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1), (b)(1).  A refugee is anyone 
who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin 
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”  Id. 
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).  An applicant can meet this definition by 
showing either (i) that he suffered past persecution or (ii) that 
he has a well-founded fear of being persecuted if returned to 
his home country.  In either case, the alleged persecution must 
be on account of a statutorily protected ground.  Chavarria, 
446 F.3d at 516. 
Although past persecution and future persecution are 
independent, “doctrinally distinct” grounds for asylum, they 
“intersect” in one significant respect: a showing of past 
persecution entitles the applicant to a rebuttable presumption 
of a well-founded fear of future persecution, which, if rebutted, 
could remove the basis for granting asylum.3  Camara v. Att’y 
 
3 Regardless of this rebuttable presumption, past persecution 
remains an independent basis for asylum because, in some 
cases, “the favorable exercise of discretion is warranted for 
humanitarian reasons even if there is little likelihood of future 
persecution.”  Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733, 740 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18-19 (BIA 
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Gen. U.S., 580 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.13(b)(1)).  “Ultimately, therefore, a well-founded fear of 
future persecution is the touchstone of asylum.”  Id.  Thus, we 
first examine Petitioner’s claim of past persecution before 
considering whether he has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution. 
A.  Past Persecution 
To establish past persecution, an applicant must show 
(i) that he was targeted for mistreatment “on account of one of 
the statutorily-protected grounds,” (ii) that the “incident, or 
incidents” of mistreatment “rise to the level of persecution,” 
and (iii) that the persecution was “committed by the 
government or forces the government is either unable or 
unwilling to control.”  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 
592 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
As to the first requirement, the Government has not 
contested that Petitioner fits within one of the INA’s protected 
categories.  Nor could it.  Petitioner’s sexual orientation and 
identity as a gay man is enough to establish his membership in 
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) 
 
1989)); accord Vongsakdy v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 
(9th Cir. 1999); Skalak v. I.N.S., 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 
1991) (explaining that, in some situations, the “experience of 
persecution may so sear a person with distressing associations 
with his native country that it would be inhumane to force him 
to return there, even though he is in no danger of further 
persecution”).  Petitioner has not made that argument here, so 
we will not address it any further. 
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community in Ghana, a “particular social group” within the 
meaning of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).4  Amanfi v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that sexual 
orientation is a cognizable basis for “membership in a social 
group”); accord Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 
1051, 1073 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (affirming that “sexual 
orientation and sexual identity can be the basis for establishing 
a particular social group”); Ayala v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 605 F.3d 
941, 949 (11th Cir. 2010); Kadri v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 16, 21 
(1st Cir. 2008); Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 661 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 2007); Nabulwala v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (recognizing that lesbians are members of a 
“particular social group” based on sexual orientation); 
Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that transgender individuals may be classified 
into a “particular social group” based on their “sexual 
orientation and sexual identity”), overruled on other grounds 
by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005); Matter 
of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (BIA 1990). 
In rejecting Petitioner’s claim, however, the IJ found 
that Petitioner had “not established that he suffered 
mistreatment on account of his sexual orientation that rises to 
 
4 We have adopted the term LGBTI in this opinion because we 
found it to be the more common formulation used across the 
relevant guidelines and reports issued by the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigrations Services (USCIS), the U.S. State 
Department, and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR).  We note that the IJ used the term 
LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer or 
questioning).  We see no meaningful distinction between these 
two formulations for purposes of our analysis. 
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the level of persecution.”  JA24 (emphasis added).  The BIA 
affirmed that finding without expressly reviewing the alleged 
motive of Petitioner’s tormentors.  We construe the IJ’s and the 
BIA’s truncated decisions as rejecting both Petitioner’s claim 
that he was targeted “on account of” his sexual orientation and 
that he suffered persecution.  See Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. 
U.S., 527 F.3d 330, 346-47 (3d Cir. 2008).  To satisfy the “on 
account of” or nexus requirement, Petitioner’s sexual 
orientation must have been a motivating factor or “at least 
one central reason” for the alleged persecution.  Id. at 340 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A persecutor may 
have multiple motivations for his or her conduct, but the 
persecutor must be motivated, at least in part, by one of the 
enumerated grounds.”).  Here, there can be no serious dispute 
that the attack and threats Petitioner suffered were motivated 
by his sexual orientation.  Petitioner credibly testified that the 
mob’s violent and menacing behavior was instigated by his 
father’s outrage at discovering him having sex with another 
man and offered evidence that his father explicitly connected 
this violent response to his disapproval of his son’s 
“homosexuality,” JA166.  Others in the mob wanted to report 
Petitioner to the police, further indicating that they were 
reacting to his same-sex relationship since that is the only 
conduct that could have conceivably incriminated him under 
Ghanaian law.  Petitioner thus has demonstrated that he was 
targeted on account of his membership in a statutorily 
protected group. 
Our focus now turns to the second requirement: whether 
the attack and death threats Petitioner suffered were serious 
enough to rise to the level of persecution.  “While this Court 
has not yet drawn a precise line concerning where a simple 
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beating ends and persecution begins, our cases suggest that 
isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury do not rise 
to the level of persecution.”  Voci v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 409 F.3d 
607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005).  In addition, it is “well settled that 
persecution does not encompass all forms of unfair, unjust, or 
even unlawful treatment.”  Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 518 (citing 
Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993)).  However, 
it is equally settled that persecution includes “death threats, 
involuntary confinement, torture, and other severe affronts to 
the life or freedom of the applicant.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 
F.3d at 341 (citing Lin v. I.N.S., 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 
2001)); Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 518. 
The parties’ disagreement centers around the reach of 
our decision in Chavarria.  There, we held that death threats 
that are “highly imminent, concrete and menacing,” and that 
“cause significant actual suffering or harm,” are cognizable 
forms of persecution.  446 F.3d at 518, 520 (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted).  The petitioner, Chavarria, 
witnessed paramilitary forces assault two women who were 
local human rights activists.  After the assailants left, Chavarria 
returned to help the women.  He later noticed that he was being 
surveilled outside his home by men that looked like the 
assailants, which he understood to be an act of intimidation by 
government forces because of his actions in helping these two 
political activists.  Id. at 513 & nn.2-4.  While he was driving 
near his home one night, several men ran him off the road, 
forced him into the backseat of his car, and robbed him at gun 
point.  The men held a gun to his head and told him, “We are 
going to leave you alone today, but if we ever catch you again 
you won’t live to talk about it.”  Id. at 513, 519.  We understood 
that event to be “about as clear a death threat as we might 
expect attackers to make.”  Id. at 520.  And even though there 
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was no evidence of “physical harm,” id. at 515, we concluded 
that Chavarria suffered harm because he was “actually robbed” 
with a “gun to his face,” id. at 520.  We reversed the BIA and 
held that these violent acts of intimidation constituted 
persecution.  Id. 
In a recent decision, issued after close of argument in 
this case, we elaborated on the test for when death threats 
amount to persecution.  See Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 
__ F.3d __, No. 19-2255, 2020 WL 962071 (3d Cir. Feb. 28, 
2020).  In Herrera-Reyes, we reviewed our threat cases, 
including Chavarria, and concluded that a threat is persecutory 
when “the cumulative effect of the threat and its corroboration 
presents a real threat to a petitioner’s life or freedom.”  Id. at 
*5.  We clarified that “imminence” is not a distinct 
requirement, but rather “a concept subsumed in the inquiry as 
to whether the threat is ‘concrete.’”  Id. at *4.  “We therefore 
refer to the standard going forward simply as ‘concrete and 
menacing.’”  Id. (citation omitted).  A threat is “concrete” 
when it is “corroborated by credible evidence,” and it is 
“menacing” when it reveals an “intention to inflict harm.”  Id. 
at *5 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
Physical harm to the applicant is one factor in the cumulative 
analysis, it is not required to render a threat “concrete and 
menacing.”  Id. at *6-*7.  The ultimate question, therefore, is 
whether “the aggregate effect” of the applicant’s experience, 
“including or culminating in the threat,” put the applicant’s 
“life in peril or created an atmosphere of fear so oppressive that 
it severely curtailed [his] liberty.”  Id. at *5. 
Crediting Petitioner’s testimony as the BIA did, we 
know that a violent mob beat Petitioner with makeshift 
weapons and dragged him across the floor from his room to a 
courtyard, causing him to bleed from his mouth and suffer 
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injuries to his head and back.  Petitioner was then threatened 
with death by burning or beheading, at the same time that he 
was being doused with kerosene and exposed to a cutlass.  In 
combination with these violent acts of intimidation and his 
injuries, the death threats were sufficiently “concrete and 
menacing,” id., to transform this incident from a “simple 
beating,” Voci, 409 F.3d at 615, into outright persecution.  
Accord Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Given the unrebutted evidence that Gashi was repeatedly 
warned, threatened with death, and attacked with deadly 
weapons including a knife and a metal knob while one attacker 
urged another to ‘[k]ill this dog here,’ we do not see why such 
abuse does not constitute persecution.” (alteration in original) 
(internal citation omitted)). 
On appeal, the Government argues, rather insistently, 
that the threats to Petitioner’s life were not “imminent or 
menacing” enough because they remained “unfulfilled,” 
relying on Li v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 400 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Resp’t Br. 18 n.4.  While we appreciate that the Government 
did not have the benefit of our decision in Herrera-Reyes, that 
case squarely foreclosed this argument.  We held that whether 
a threat is sufficiently “concrete and menacing,” which 
includes the notion of “imminence,” does not turn on whether 
the threat was ultimately fulfilled, but on whether – in the 
context of the applicant’s cumulative experience – it was a 
“severe affront” to his “life or freedom.”  Herrera-Reyes, 2020 
WL 962071, at *5 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The threats in Li were not persecutory because of 
“the lack of any corroborating harm” to the applicant or his 
close associates, not merely because they were unfulfilled.  Id. 
at *4 (citing Li, 400 F.3d at 165). 
Moreover, in Li, the applicant was threatened with 
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forced sterilization, detention and physical abuse for violating 
China’s population control policy, not death, so it made sense 
that we would consider whether any of those threats remained 
unfulfilled in concluding that they were not sufficiently 
concrete and menacing.  400 F.3d at 159, 165.  We find it odd 
for the Government to make this argument here considering 
that Petitioner was threatened with death by fire or decapitation 
while being assaulted, doused with fuel and exposed to a 
cutlass.  All that was left for the mob to do was to cut off his 
head or set him on fire.  See Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 520 (“This 
threat is unlike the threats we encountered in Li, which were 
merely verbal and not concrete because here, the attackers 
actually robbed Chavarria, pointed a gun to his face, and 
threatened him with death if he told his story.”).  Had Petitioner 
not managed to escape, he might very well be dead.  To expect 
Petitioner to remain idle in that situation – waiting to see if his 
would-be executioners would go through with their threats – 
before he could qualify as a refugee would upend the 
“fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.”  Matter 
of S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (BIA 1996) (“In enacting the 
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 
[amending the INA], Congress sought to bring the Act’s 
definition of ‘refugee’ into conformity with the United Nations 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and, in so doing, give ‘statutory meaning to our 
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian 
concerns.’”) (footnote omitted) (citing S. Rep. No. 256, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 
144). 
Neither the IJ nor the BIA addressed the significance of 
these threats under the dispositive case law available at that 
time, namely Chavarria, and that omission derailed their 
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analysis.  The IJ focused exclusively on the “beating,” finding 
that this incident was not extreme enough to constitute 
persecution because Petitioner had only been attacked once 
and he “did not require medical treatment.”  JA24 (relying on 
Kibinda v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 477 F.3d 113, 119-20 (3d Cir. 
2007); Voci, 409 F.3d at 615; and Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 
221, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)).  The BIA agreed that this “isolated” 
incident did not rise to the level of persecution because 
Petitioner “was not so injured that he required medical 
attention and he was able to run to his friend’s house, which 
was some distance away[.]”  JA14 (relying on Chen, 381 F.3d 
at 234-35).  That analysis was based on a misunderstanding of 
the law and must be reversed. 
We have never held that persecution requires more than 
one incident.  Rather, we have left open the possibility that a 
single incident, if sufficiently egregious, may constitute 
persecution.  Voci, 409 F.3d at 615 (explaining that “the 
existence of multiple incidents is not a requirement”).  In Voci, 
we cited two decisions from the Seventh Circuit to stress that 
the number of past incidents is “merely one variable” for 
finding past persecution, id. at 615 (quoting Dandan v. 
Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 573 (7th Cir. 2003)), and that “even a 
single beating can constitute persecution,” id. (citing Asani v. 
I.N.S., 154 F.3d 719, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
Nor have we conditioned a finding of past persecution 
on whether the victim required medical attention or on whether 
he was too hurt to escape his aggressors, or even on whether 
the victim was physically harmed at all.  See Herrera-Reyes, 
2020 WL 962071, at *6 (“We have never reduced our 
persecution analysis to a checklist or suggested that physical 
violence—or any other single type of mistreatment—is a 
required element of the past persecution determination.”); 
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Kibinda, 477 F.3d at 120 (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that 
the severity of an injury should be measured in stitches[.]”).  
Quite the opposite.  In Chavarria, we held that violent death 
threats crossed the threshold into persecution, even though 
there was no indication that the applicant required medical 
care, was unable to run away, or was otherwise physically 
harmed.  446 F.3d at 515, 520; see also Herrera-Reyes, 2020 
WL 962071, at *8 (holding that, in context, a single death 
threat was persecution even without physical harm to the 
applicant).5 
Petitioner’s claim is more obvious than Chavarria’s (or 
Herrera-Reyes’).  In addition to having his life credibly 
threatened by accompanying acts of violent intimidation, 
Petitioner suffered actual physical harm from the beating, not 
to mention the emotional suffering he has endured.  See 
Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as 
physical.”).  The Government admits that the assault caused 
“physically painful” injuries but insists that that record does 
not compel finding that this “unfortunate” beating was serious 
enough to be persecution.  Oral Ar. at 14:40-53.  It is debatable 
whether the record contains enough evidence to ascertain the 
 
5 Neither Chen nor Kibinda foreclosed the possibility that 
outrageous conduct, even if limited to a single event without 
physical harm, could rise to the level of persecution, as was the 
case in Chavarria.  Indeed, we have since made clear that 
physical harm is not required for a threat to be “concrete and 
menacing,” so long as it “placed [the applicant’s] life in peril 
or created an atmosphere of fear so oppressive that it severely 
curtailed [his] liberty.” Herrera-Reyes, 2020 WL 962071, at 
*5. 
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full extent of Petitioner’s injuries, but our decision need not 
hinge on the severity of those injuries because this case 
involves so much more. 
Although Petitioner would succeed even in the absence 
of any physical injury under Chavarria (and now also under 
Herrera-Reyes), we note that the IJ and the BIA 
mischaracterized or misunderstood his testimony with respect 
to his injuries.  Petitioner never testified that he “did not require 
medical treatment.”  JA24.  He testified: “I was so afraid, I was 
so, so afraid that I couldn’t even go to a hospital.  I was just 
afraid.”  JA115 (Tr. 53:20–21) (emphasis added).  It may be 
that he should have sought medical care or that medical 
treatment was otherwise required.  All we know from his 
testimony is that he did not seek medical care because he feared 
for his well-being.  Nor does the fact that he had the strength 
to escape execution diminish the risk he faced or the severity 
of his injuries.  To the contrary, it is a testament to the extreme 
fear he felt and to the sheer human will to survive the most 
dangerous of situations.   
In short, because the IJ and the BIA accepted 
Petitioner’s testimony as true “but then proceeded to misstate 
and ignore certain relevant aspects of that testimony,” 
Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 522, and because they committed legal 
error by finding that a single beating without severe physical 
injury to Petitioner was dispositive, their determination that his 
experience did not rise to the level of past persecution must be 
overturned. 
This brings us to the third requirement.  Because 
Petitioner contends that he was attacked by private rather than 
government actors, he must demonstrate that Ghanaian 
authorities are unable or unwilling to control this sort of anti-
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gay violence.  The Government argues that Petitioner cannot 
meet this requirement because he did not report the assault to 
the police – an omission that the Government believes is “fatal” 
to his claim.  Resp’t Br. 18.  We disagree.   
“The absence of a report to police does not reveal 
anything about a government’s ability or willingness to control 
private attackers; instead, it leaves a gap in proof about how 
the government would respond if asked, which the petitioner 
may attempt to fill by other methods.”  Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 
F.3d at 1066 (quoting Rahimzadeh v. Holder, 613 F.3d 916, 
922 (9th Cir. 2010)).  An applicant may “fill the evidentiary 
gap” in various ways:  
1) demonstrating that a country’s 
laws or customs effectively 
deprive the petitioner of any 
meaningful recourse to 
governmental protection, 
2) describing [p]rior interactions 
with the authorities, 
3) showing that others have made 
reports of similar incidents to no 
avail, 
4) establishing that private 
persecution of a particular sort is 
widespread and well-known but 
not controlled by the government, 
or  
5) convincingly establish[ing] that 
20 
 
[reporting] would have been futile 
or [would] have subjected [the 
applicant] to further abuse. 
Id. at 1066–67 (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   
In Bringas-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit held that a gay 
applicant was not required to report abusers to Mexican 
authorities because “ample evidence,” including the 
applicant’s testimony, affidavits, country reports, and news 
clippings, “demonstrate[d] that reporting would have been 
futile and dangerous.”  Id. at 1073-74; see Hernandez-Avalos 
v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 952 (4th Cir. 2015) (excusing the 
applicant’s failure to report death threats to the police, because 
credible testimony and country conditions provided “abundant 
evidence” to conclude that reporting would have been 
counterproductive); Matter of S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 
1330, 1333, 1335 (BIA 2000) (concluding that a Muslim 
woman with liberal religious beliefs did not need to report her 
abusive orthodox father to police to establish the Moroccan 
government’s inability or unwillingness to protect her, because 
it was clear from country conditions and credible testimony 
that it would have been “unproductive” and “potentially 
dangerous” to do so under Moroccan law and “societal 
religious mores”). 
Here, the record is replete with evidence that Ghanaian 
law deprives gay men such as Petitioner of any meaningful 
recourse to government protection and that reporting his 
incident would have been futile and potentially dangerous.   
Ghana criminalizes same-sex male relationships under 
the guise of “unnatural carnal knowledge,” defined to include 
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“sexual intercourse with a person in an unnatural manner or 
with an animal.”  Ghana Criminal Code § 104(2); see JA183.  
The text of this law – equating same-sex male relationships to 
sex with an animal – is already a clear indication of the 
government’s official position on gay men.  Although the law 
classifies consensual sex between men as a “misdemeanor,” 
Ghana Criminal Code § 104(1)(b), the offense is punishable by 
up to three years in prison, Ghana Criminal Procedure Code 
§ 296(4).6  Prosecution and disproportionate punishment based 
on any of the INA’s protected grounds, including sexual 
orientation, are cognizable forms of persecution, “even if the 
law is ‘generally’ applicable.”  Chang v. I.N.S., 119 F.3d 1055, 
1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that prosecution and 
“punishment of up to one year of imprisonment [on account of 
political opinion], and perhaps significantly more, are 
sufficiently severe to constitute ‘persecution’ under this 
Circuit’s standard in Fatin”) (citing Rodriguez-Roman v. 
I.N.S., 98 F.3d 416, 431 (9th Cir. 1996), and Matter of Janus 
& Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 875 (BIA 1968)); accord 
 
6 When a foreign law is raised, federal courts have 
discretionary authority to investigate the content of that law 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, which states 
that “the court may consider any relevant material or source 
. . . whether or not submitted by a party,” and “the court’s 
determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”  
See Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 
2013) (en banc); Abdille, 242 F.3d at 489-90 n.10 (recognizing 
this discretionary authority in the context of reviewing asylum 
appeals but declining to exercise it in the circumstances of that 
case) (citing Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 197 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1997)); Sidali, 107 F.3d at 197 (“The determination of foreign 
law in the federal courts is a question of law.”). 
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Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“Because the prohibition [of homosexual conduct] is directly 
related to a protected ground—membership in the particular 
social group of homosexual men—prosecution under the law 
will always constitute persecution.”); Perkovic v. I.N.S., 33 
F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that prosecution and 
incarceration under a law prohibiting “peaceful expression of 
dissenting political opinion” would amount to persecution). 
Had Petitioner reported the beating or threats, he would 
have outed himself and his partner to the police and, on that 
basis, he could have been arrested, prosecuted and 
incarcerated, compounding the persecution he had already 
suffered.  This fact alone is compelling, if not dispositive, 
evidence that Petitioner had no meaningful recourse against his 
father’s and the mob’s homophobic violence.  At best, seeking 
help from the police would have been counterproductive. 
Furthermore, the State Department’s 2016 country 
report indicates that LGBTI persons in Ghana are generally 
afraid to report homophobic abuse because they fear further 
harassment and intimidation at the hands of police officers.  
The report states: 
[LGBTI persons] faced police 
harassment and extortion attempts.  
There were reports police were 
reluctant to investigate claims of 
assault or violence against LGBTI 
persons. . . . 
While there were no reported cases 
of police or government violence 
against LGBTI persons during the 
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year, stigma, intimidation, and the 
attitude of the police toward 
LGBTI persons were factors in 
preventing victims from reporting 
incidents of abuse. 
JA183-84 (emphasis added).  The Amnesty International 
2016/17 country report provides additional support for that 
assessment, stating that “[l]ocal organizations reported that 
LGBTI people continued to face police harassment.”  JA195.   
In fact, Petitioner credibly testified that he did not report 
the assault and death threats because he feared negative 
repercussions for being gay: “I know that [homosexuality] is 
not something that is acceptable in my country, I know that the 
police would not like it as well, so my heart was racing, I was 
afraid.  I was very afraid.”  JA102 (Tr. 40:10-12).  Petitioner 
was not alone in his fear.  His friend was also afraid to call the 
police out of concern that his own life would be threatened for 
sheltering a gay man.  There is also evidence that Petitioner’s 
tormentors felt empowered by law to respond violently to his 
same-sex relationship.  Petitioner testified that certain people 
in the mob wanted to report him to police, not because they 
wanted to rescue him, but because they wanted to punish him, 
apparently fearing no consequences for their own homicidal 
and criminal conduct.  In those circumstances, it is 
unreasonable to expect Petitioner to turn to the police for 
protection. 
The record also shows that the Ghanaian government is 
unable or unwilling to protect LGBTI persons from other forms 
of mistreatment.  For instance, Ghanaian law does not prohibit 
anti-gay discrimination even though there is a well-
documented hostility towards the LGBTI community 
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throughout the country.  According to the State Department 
country report, “societal discrimination against [LGBTI] 
individuals” rises to the level of a “human rights problem,” 
JA173, and discrimination against LGBTI individuals in 
education and employment is “widespread,” JA183.  The 
report cites data from Ghana’s Commission on Human Rights 
and Administrative Justice, showing that “men who have sex 
with men” are among the groups of people who have reported 
incidents of “stigma and discrimination,” including breaches 
of protected health information, blackmail/extortion, 
harassment/threats, and violence or physical abuse.  JA184.  
Amnesty International’s country report confirms that LGBTI 
individuals face “discrimination, violence and instances of 
blackmail in the wider community.”  JA195.  Petitioner 
submitted other evidence echoing these accounts, including a 
letter from his friend stating that “authorities in Ghana ha[ve] 
minimal concern[] for gay rights and politicians are always 
promising electorates of eradicating gays,” JA162 ¶ 11, as well 
as a news report evincing anti-gay political rhetoric ahead of 
the 2016 general elections. 
Notwithstanding all of this evidence, the IJ concluded 
that “country conditions do not indicate” that the Ghanaian 
government is unable or unwilling to protect Petitioner as a gay 
man.  JA25.  The IJ found that, even though same-sex male 
relationships are criminalized and “discrimination against 
LGBTQ individuals is not illegal,” Ghanaian authorities could 
be expected to “prosecute individuals who commit assault 
against LGBTQ persons because of their sexual orientation.”  
JA25.  He noted that the State Department country report 
referenced “a case that was underway in which an individual 
was being prosecuted for assaulting a gay man in Accra in 
2015.”  JA25 n.2.  The IJ also discounted reports of “stigma 
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[and] intimidation by the police,” because “there were no 
reports of police or government violence against LGBTQ 
persons.”  JA25.  In affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA 
emphasized that, even though sex between men is 
criminalized, “the offense is only a misdemeanor.”  JA15, 25. 
Given the totality of the record, these findings cannot 
withstand even our most deferential review.  Although 
technically correct that sex between men is classified as a 
“misdemeanor,” the IJ and the BIA failed to appreciate the 
serious risks of revealing a same-sex relationship to the police, 
not the least of which is the affront to the victim’s freedom 
from being prosecuted and punished like a common criminal, 
or how those risks effectively prevent victims of anti-gay 
violence from seeking government protection.  See Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“The offense [consensual 
sex between men], to be sure, is but a class C misdemeanor, a 
minor offense in the Texas legal system.  Still, it remains a 
criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the 
persons charged.”). 
The IJ and the BIA also ignored the fact that “stigma, 
intimidation, and the attitude of the police toward LGBTI 
persons” are “factors in preventing victims from reporting 
incidents of abuse.”  JA184.  Considering that homophobic 
violence goes largely unreported because LGBTI persons fear 
harassment and extortion at the hands of police officers, one 
case in which anti-gay violence was supposedly prosecuted is 
hardly probative of the government’s ability or willingness to 
protect gay men.  Because the IJ and the BIA disregarded, 
mischaracterized and understated evidence favorable to 
Petitioner, including relevant portions of his testimony and the 
country reports, “the BIA succeeded in reaching a conclusion 
not supported by substantial evidence such that we are 
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compelled to reach a conclusion to the contrary.”  Chavarria, 
446 F.3d at 517-18. 
Lastly, days before oral argument, the Government filed 
a letter styled under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), 
suggesting for the first time that, if this case were remanded, 
we should instruct the BIA to reconsider the issue of whether 
the Ghanaian government is unable or unwilling to control the 
alleged persecution under the Attorney General’s guidance in 
Matter of A-B-,27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
The Government did not raise remand or Matter of A-B- 
in its brief, even though that case was issued months after the 
BIA’s ruling and months before the Government filed its brief 
in this Court.  Therefore, that argument is waived.  See United 
States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 163 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that appellant had waived argument raised for the first time in 
a Rule 28(j) letter); United States v. Leeson, 453 F.3d 631, 638 
n.4 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that appellant had waived 
argument based on a case raised for the first time in a Rule 28(j) 
letter when that case was readily available at the time appellant 
filed its brief).7 
 
7 In any event, at oral argument, the Government took 
seemingly conflicting positions, conceding at one point that 
Matter of A-B- does not apply to this case.  Given the 
Government’s own hesitation in relying on Matter of A-B- in 
this case, the relevance of that decision is doubtful at best, so 
we see no benefit in remanding to the BIA with instructions to 
revisit this issue.  We take no position as to whether Matter of 
A-B- has materially changed the relevant standard or whether 
the Government could properly move to relitigate this issue on 
remand.  See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130, 146 
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In sum, the record before us compels finding that 
Petitioner suffered past persecution. 
B.  Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution 
Next, we review the IJ’s and the BIA’s determination 
that Petitioner does not have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.  Given that Petitioner has demonstrated past 
persecution on account of his sexual orientation and identity as 
a gay man, he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of a “well-
founded fear of future persecution” on the same basis.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.13(b)(1). 
To rebut that presumption, the Government would need 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that 
Petitioner could escape persecution by relocating to another 
part of Ghana and that “relocation would be reasonable,” or 
that conditions in Ghana have so fundamentally changed, i.e., 
improved for gay men specifically since Petitioner was 
persecuted in 2016, that his past persecution is no longer 
indicative of the risk he faces if returned to Ghana.  Leia v. 
Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005); Konan v. Att’y 
Gen. U.S., 432 F.3d 497, 501 (3d Cir. 2005); see Berishaj v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[G]eneralized 
 
(D.D.C. 2018) (permanently enjoining the Government from 
applying certain aspects of Matter of A-B- as arbitrary, 
capricious, and unlawful, and holding that the “‘unwilling or 
unable’ persecution standard was settled at the time the 
Refugee Act was codified, and therefore the Attorney 
General’s ‘condoned’ or ‘complete helplessness’ standard is 
not a permissible construction of the persecution 
requirement”), appeal pending, No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir.). 
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improvements in country conditions will not suffice as 
rebuttals to credible testimony and other evidence establishing 
past persecution.”), abrogated on other grounds by Nbaye v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., 665 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2011).  The Government 
was not held to this burden, nor was Petitioner afforded the 
benefit of this favorable presumption, because both the IJ and 
the BIA incorrectly concluded that he had not suffered past 
persecution. 
Ordinarily, we would vacate this portion of the BIA’s 
decision and remand with instructions to reconsider the issue 
of future persecution from the correct vantage point.  See 
Konan, 432 F.3d at 501 (explaining that our review of the 
BIA’s decision “is limited to the rationale that the agency 
provides,” and that we are “powerless to decide in the first 
instance issues that an agency does not reach”); Lusingo v. 
Gonzales, 420 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 2005) (“When 
deficiencies in the BIA’s decision make it impossible for us to 
meaningfully review its decision, we must vacate that decision 
and remand so that the BIA can further explain its reasoning.” 
(quoting Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 
2003))).  But remand for this purpose is not necessary here, 
because even without applying the presumption and 
corresponding burden-shifting framework, the IJ’s and the 
BIA’s finding that Petitioner does not have a well-founded fear 
of future persecution cannot stand on this record.  See 
Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 520-22 (reversing BIA on past 
persecution and future persecution without applying the 
presumption). 
Furthermore, considering that the Government did not 
introduce evidence of changed country conditions or even 
attempt to make the case that conditions have changed, it 
would be unfair to give the Government a second bite at the 
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apple.  See Toure v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 443 F.3d 310, 321-23 (3d 
Cir. 2006); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1078 & n.11 
(9th Cir. 2004).  Thus, we review the IJ’s and the BIA’s future 
persecution determination as they made it: putting the burden 
on Petitioner. 
An applicant that has not suffered past persecution may 
still qualify for asylum if he can demonstrate that he has a well-
founded fear of future persecution either (i) “because he would 
be individually singled out for persecution” on account of a 
statutorily protected ground, or (ii) “because there is a pattern 
or practice in his home country of persecution against a group 
of which he is a member.”  Khan v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 691 F.3d 
488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Huang, 620 F.3d at 381).  
“The source of the persecution must be the government or 
forces that the government is unwilling or unable to control.”  
Id. (quoting Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 
2007)).  The applicant’s fear of persecution must be “genuine” 
and “reasonable in light of all of the record evidence.”  
Lusingo, 420 F.3d at 199 (characterizing “well-founded fear of 
future persecution” as having both a subjective and objective 
component).  The IJ found that, although Petitioner “ha[d] 
credibly testified that he subjectively fears persecution if 
returned to Ghana,” he failed to show that “a reasonable person 
would fear the same.”  JA25.  There is no dispute that 
Petitioner’s subjective fear is genuine.  Thus, we focus on 
whether his fear of future persecution is objectively reasonable. 
To satisfy the objective component, an applicant must 
produce evidence showing that future persecution is a 
“reasonable possibility.”  Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 175.  Under 
this standard, the applicant is not required to prove that future 
persecution is “more likely than not” to occur.  Id. at 177 (citing 
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987)).  Even a 
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ten percent chance will do.  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.  
The applicant’s credible testimony alone may be enough to 
satisfy this requirement.  Dong v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 638 F.3d 
223, 228 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (“The 
testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to 
sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.”)).  He may 
also rely on the testimony of corroborating witnesses and 
evidence of country conditions to bolster his claim.  Id. 
Here, the IJ found that, even though Petitioner “fears his 
father will try to kill him if he returns to Ghana,” he had not 
proven “by a preponderance of credible and probative 
evidence” that “he faces a ‘reasonable possibility’ of being 
singled out for persecution in Ghana.”  JA25.  The IJ noted that 
“country conditions do not indicate” that Petitioner would be 
subject to any mistreatment that rises to the level of 
persecution.  JA25.  The IJ also found that, while there may be 
a risk of “stigma or intimidation by the police,” the risk was 
not significant enough because “there were no reports of police 
or government violence against LGBTQ persons.”  JA25.  And 
although “discrimination against LGBTQ individuals is not 
illegal,” the IJ found that Ghanaian authorities could be 
expected to protect gay men from homophobic abuse based on 
a single case in which anti-gay violence was supposedly 
prosecuted.  JA25.  In affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA 
emphasized that sex between men is “only a misdemeanor” and 
that any “discrimination” Petitioner “may face in Ghana does 
not rise to the level of persecution.”  JA15.  These findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence, because they are based 
on mischaracterizations, unreasonable inferences, and an 
incomplete assessment of the record. 
Petitioner has produced ample evidence to conclude that 
there is a reasonable possibility that he would be singled out 
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for persecution in Ghana because he is gay.  He credibly 
testified that his father is still looking for him and continues to 
tell people that he will kill Petitioner when he finds him 
because he is ashamed of his sexual orientation.  These are not 
empty threats.  Recall that Petitioner’s father and his cohort 
beat him with iron rods and wooden sticks and dragged him 
across the floor from his bedroom into a courtyard, where they 
doused him with fuel and brandished a cutlass, all while 
threatening to decapitate him or set him on fire.  That incident 
is indicative of the type of anti-gay violence awaiting Petitioner 
if he returns home.  See Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 520 (noting 
that, even if past threats are not treated as persecution, “they 
are often quite indicative of a danger of future persecution”).  
Based on Petitioner’s experience, we hold that the ongoing 
threats to his life are “menacing and credible” enough to 
“imply a risk of future persecution.”  R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 
F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2014) (accepting the applicant’s 
testimony that his persecutors were still looking for him and 
threatening him).  The IJ’s and the BIA’s failure to consider 
the risk presented by these threats in light of Petitioner’s 
experience doomed their future persecution analysis. 
Petitioner has also demonstrated that his experience was 
not a random or isolated act of private violence, but rather part 
of a pattern or practice of persecution against the LGBTI 
community in Ghana more generally.  He credibly testified that 
anti-gay attitudes are not unique to his family or neighbors; 
they are common among the country’s Muslim and Christian 
populations at large.  The State Department’s and Amnesty 
International’s country reports concur that anti-gay 
discrimination, harassment, and violence are a country-wide 
human rights problem, due in large part to the fact that same-
sex male relationships are criminalized and discrimination 
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against LGBTI persons is not illegal.  As explained more fully 
above, Petitioner cannot count on Ghanaian authorities to 
protect him as an outed gay man.  When “stigma, intimidation, 
and the attitude of the police toward LGBTI persons” are 
significant “factors in preventing victims from reporting” anti-
gay violence, JA184, the absence of reported incidents cannot 
be dispositive of the degree of risk of future persecution. 
Up until the attack, Petitioner’s ability to avoid this sort 
of homophobic abuse hinged on his ability to dissemble his 
sexual orientation and keep his sexual relationship with his 
partner hidden.  No major leap is required to conclude that 
other gay men like Petitioner are escaping persecution by 
hiding or suppressing their sexuality as well.  Indeed, anti-gay 
laws such as Ghana’s criminalization of sex between men are 
intended to stigmatize and punish, in effect, to suppress the 
expression of gay identity and sexuality in society.  Cf. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
effect of Texas’ sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of 
prosecution or consequence of conviction.  Texas’ sodomy law 
brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more 
difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as 
everyone else.”).  Secreting his gay identity is not a workable 
solution for Petitioner.  Now that he has been publicly outed 
by his father, the risk of future persecution at the hands of 
uncontrolled private actors has increased, as evidenced by his 
father’s success at enlisting neighbors willing to assault and 
kill him because he is gay. 
Petitioner is also at a higher risk of being prosecuted and 
punished, i.e., persecuted by the state, after being outed as a 
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gay man.8  The Government responds that any future risk of 
arrest is not persecution because it would be “arbitrary.”  Oral 
Arg. at 21:25.  That argument misses the mark.  The issue is 
not arbitrary arrest but state-sanctioned prosecution and 
punishment on account of a statutorily protected status.  In no 
other context would prosecution and disproportionate 
punishment based on any of the INA’s protected grounds be 
anything other than persecution.  If Petitioner were facing these 
risks because of his religious beliefs or political opinion, we 
would not hesitate to find an objectively reasonable fear of 
future persecution in these circumstances.  See, e.g., Chang, 
119 F.3d at 1067 (finding reasonable fear of future persecution 
based on the risk of being prosecuted and incarcerated for up 
to a year or more on account of political opinion).   
The Government further argues that any 
“discrimination” Petitioner faces in Ghana is “insufficient to 
rise to the level of persecution.”  Resp’t Br. 19 (citing 
Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 781 F.3d 677 (3d Cir. 
2015)).  To be clear, “discrimination” is a gross 
mischaracterization of the risk Petitioner faces if returned to 
Ghana.  Moreover, Gonzalez-Posadas is inapposite.  That case 
did not deal with asylum but with withholding of removal, 
which requires a higher threshold than the more forgiving 
“reasonable possibility” standard required for asylum.  See id. 
at 688.  There, the court upheld the BIA’s finding that a 
 
8 Incarceration is not the only risk.  According to the State 
Department country report, “[g]ay men in prison were often 
subjected to sexual and other physical abuse.”  JA183-84.  
Nothing in the record suggests that Ghanaian authorities are 
making any efforts to combat that sort of homophobic 
violence. 
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Honduran gay man had not established that it was “more likely 
than not” that he would be persecuted “on account of his sexual 
orientation,” and ruled that “the record [did] not compel the 
conclusion that there [was] a ‘systematic, pervasive, or 
organized’ pattern or practice of persecution of LGBT persons 
in Honduras,” to warrant withholding of removal.  Id.  Notably, 
unlike here, there was no indication that Honduras criminalizes 
same-sex male relationships.  And, unlike here, “the Honduran 
government ha[d] established a special unit in the attorney 
general’s office to investigate crimes against LGBT persons 
and other vulnerable groups.”  Id.   Inversely, here, unlike in 
Gonzalez-Posadas, there is no dispute that Petitioner was 
targeted because of his sexual orientation. 
In short, we hold that Petitioner’s objective experience 
with anti-gay violence, the ongoing threats to his life, Ghana’s 
criminalization of same-sex male relationships and the 
widespread unchecked discrimination against LGBTI persons, 
“combine to satisfy the requirement that [his] fear of 
persecution be objectively reasonable.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 
F.3d at 348 (holding that an applicant’s fear was objectively 
reasonable based on her “objective experience” of past 
violence against her family, “the threats she herself ha[d] 
received,” and the country reports corroborating the 
widespread risk of further persecution); accord Chavarria, 446 
F.3d at 521-22. 
Lastly, Petitioner must show that he cannot avoid 
persecution by relocating to another part of the country or that 
relocation is unreasonable.  8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii).  The IJ 
found that there was no indication that Petitioner “would not 
be safe from his family if he relocated to another part of 
Ghana.”  JA25.  That finding is based on unreasonable 
presumptions and a misunderstanding or mischaracterization 
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of relevant evidence.  Petitioner has reason to believe his father 
is still looking for him.  Nothing in the record suggests that his 
father cannot travel freely around the country in search of 
Petitioner.  Considering that Ghana’s criminalization of same-
sex male relationships is country-wide, and that “widespread,” 
JA183, homophobia and anti-gay abuse is a “human rights 
problem,” JA173, relocation is not an effective option for 
escaping persecution.   
Nor is it a reasonable solution.  Relocation is not 
reasonable if it requires a person to “liv[e] in hiding.”  Agbor 
v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2007); accord Singh 
v. Sessions, 898 F.3d 518, 522 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The case law 
is clear that an alien cannot be forced to live in hiding in order 
to avoid persecution.”).  To avoid persecution now that he has 
been outed, Petitioner would have to return to hiding and 
suppressing his identity and sexuality as a gay man.  Tellingly, 
the IJ’s observation, no matter how ill-advised, that Petitioner 
could avoid persecution and live a “full life” if he kept “his 
homosexuality a secret,” JA25, was a tacit admission that 
suppressing his identity and sexuality as a gay man is the only 
option Petitioner has to stay safe in Ghana.  The notion that one 
can live a “full life” while being forced to hide or suppress a 
core component of one’s identity is an oxymoron.  See Qiu v. 
Holder, 611 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he only way 
Qiu can avoid persecution is to cease the practice of [his 
religion] or hope to evade discovery.  Putting Qiu to such a 
choice runs contrary to the language and purpose of 
our asylum laws.”); UNHCR, Guidelines on International 
Protection No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual 
Orientation and/or Gender Identity within the context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees at ¶ 27 (2012) [hereinafter 
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“UNHCR Sexual Orientation Guidelines”] (“Even if 
irregularly, rarely or ever enforced, criminal laws prohibiting 
same-sex relations could lead to an intolerable predicament for 
an LGB person rising to the level of persecution.”).9  Thus, on 
this record, Petitioner has made a compelling case that moving 
to another part of the country is not an effective or reasonable 
means of avoiding persecution. 
In summary, the record compels finding that there is, at 
least, a “reasonable possibility” that Petitioner will be 
persecuted in Ghana because he is gay, and therefore, he has 
demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
* * * 
We conclude with a final observation about Petitioner’s 
claim for withholding of removal.  Unlike asylum, withholding 
 
9 The introduction to the UNHCR Sexual Orientation 
Guidelines notes that they are intended to “complement the 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention 
(Reissued, Geneva, 2011).”  While these sources lack the 
“force of law,” they provide “significant guidance” for 
processing asylum claims in accordance with international 
standards in the United States.  Chang, 119 F.3d at 1061-62 
(quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 439 n.22); see, e.g., 
Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1057 n.2 (referencing UNHCR 
Sexual Orientation Guidelines); N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 
1052, 1061 (10th Cir. 2009) (Henry, J., concurring) (noting 
that “our Supreme Court has consistently turned for assistance 
[to UNHCR] in interpreting our obligations under the Refugee 
Convention”). 
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of removal is nondiscretionary if the applicant can show a 
“clear probability” of future persecution, i.e., that the feared 
persecution is “more likely than not” to occur.  Gonzalez-
Posadas, 781 F.3d at 684, 687. 
In the absence of evidence that the Ghanaian 
government is looking to prosecute Petitioner or that other gay 
men have been prosecuted in Ghana, or other evidence that 
government officials are directly responsible for persecutory 
violence against LGBTI persons, the current record does not 
compel – nor preclude – finding that Petitioner is “more likely 
than not” to be persecuted by government actors if returned to 
Ghana.  See Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1079 (remanding on the 
issue of “clear probability” with instructions to consider 
whether “the Jamaican law criminalizing homosexual 
conduct,” “combined with evidence of widespread violence 
targeted at homosexuals, makes it more likely than not that [the 
applicant] will be persecuted on account of his sexual 
orientation”). 
By contrast, Petitioner has made a stronger showing 
that, now that he has been outed as a gay man, he is more likely 
than not to be singled out for persecution by uncontrolled 
private actors.  That finding may even be compelled by the 
record when viewed through the lens of the favorable 
presumption to which he is entitled.  See Gonzalez-Posadas, 
781 F.3d at 684 (noting that this presumption applies to 
withholding of removal).  Because we believe our decision 
today is enough to qualify Petitioner for a discretionary grant 
of asylum, we will not undertake to apply this presumption in 
the first instance, even though it would be appropriate to do so 
since the Government has not attempted to make the case that 
country conditions have changed.  See Toure, 443 F.3d at 322 
(applying the presumption in the first instance).  Therefore, we 
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leave it to the BIA, if necessary, to reconsider on remand the 
question of whether Petitioner has satisfied the heightened 
standard for withholding of removal consistent with our 
finding that he suffered past persecution and has a well-
founded fear of future persecution.10 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because Petitioner suffered past persecution and has a 
 
10 In case the BIA decides to remand to the IJ for any reason, 
we caution the IJ to exercise greater sensitivity when 
processing Petitioner’s application, as we are troubled by some 
of the IJ’s comments and questions.  In addition to suggesting 
that Petitioner would be better off hiding his identity as a gay 
man, the IJ questioned him in explicit detail about his sexual 
relations with his partner, going so far as to ask about sexual 
positions.  It is unclear why that line of questioning would be 
relevant to Petitioner’s claim, but to the extent those questions 
were intended to establish or test his self-identification as a gay 
man, they were off base and inappropriate.  We urge IJs to heed 
sensible questioning techniques for all applicants, including 
LGBTI applicants.  See Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 
1288 (10th Cir. 2009) (censuring an IJ for relying on his own 
misguided stereotypes of gay men); Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 
478, 492 (2d Cir. 2008) (cautioning against “impermissible 
reliance on preconceived assumptions about homosexuality 
and homosexuals”); USCIS, RAIO Directorate – Officer 
Training: Guidance for Adjudicating Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) Refugee and Asylum 
Claims 34 (Dec. 28, 2011) (“The applicant’s specific sexual 
practices are not relevant to the claim for asylum or refugee 
status.  Therefore, asking questions about ‘what he or she does 
in bed’ is never appropriate.”); UNHCR Sexual Orientation 
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well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his 
sexual orientation and identity as a gay man, he qualifies as a 
refugee under the INA.  Therefore, we will vacate the BIA’s 
decision and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.11 
 
Guidelines ¶ 63.vii (“Detailed questions about the applicant’s 
sex life should be avoided.”); see also Kimberly Topel, “So, 
What Should I Ask Him to Prove that He’s Gay?”: How 
Sincerity, and Not Stereotype, Should Dictate the Outcome of 
an LGB Asylum Claim in the United States, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. 2357, 2374 (2017) (“IJs who use stereotypes as a basis 
for their decisions and subject respondents to demeaning and 
irrelevant questioning about their sexuality do more than just 
risk excluding those who truly are refugees—the negative 
psychological effects on respondents in these situations have 
been well-documented.”). 
11 We acknowledge and thank the instructors and students from 
the Immigration Law Clinic at West Virginia University 
College of Law for their skillful pro bono representation of 
Petitioner in this appeal. 
